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USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE MATERIALS IN
TEACHING WITHIN THE STANDARD,
GENERALIST LAW CURRICULUM:
A CRITERION FOR THEIR
REFINED INTEGRATION
LEIGH HUNT GREENHAW*
I. INTRODUCTION
That lawyers and jurists should consider empirical social science
findings more fully and with greater sophistication in making legal de-
cisions is not a novel proposition. Nor is the corollary that legal educa-
tion has a logical responsibility to promote this end. The more difficult
question has been how to incorporate social science in a law course:
how to teach law and not duplicate efforts of social science education;
whether social science should dictate the conceptual framework of the
course, be integrated with legal materials as part of legal methodology,
or be confined to descriptive background to enhance understanding of
legal materials. Pragmatic concerns complicate the issue: the rapid
rate at which legal materials that should be covered expand, the limited
abilities of a law professor not formally trained in social science, and
teaching within a standard curriculum geared largely to preparation for
private practice.
The thesis of this Article is that the primary and unique task of legal
education is furthering insight into the distinct pattern of relationship
among theory, norms, and empirical fact. This is the activity and life
of the law and the pattern serves as a conceptual framework for inte-
grating social science materials in legal education. Social science is in-
tegral to "fact management," a process that underlies the competent
lawyering capacities that a generalist education seeks to develop.1
These capacities include: sense of social perspective, adequate infor-
mation, ability in dialectical reasoning, and skill in operations. Assimi-
* Associate in Law, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1972;
J.D., Washington University, 1975.
1. See text accompanying note 48 infra. This term and the following list of capacities are set
forth in Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering-Case Method in a Functional Context, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 535, 562-65, 578 app. (1976).
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lation, selection, and presentation of complex social fact, or fact
management, underlies all of these capacities. As such, it unifies theo-
retical skills and practical or applied ones. Social science may be used
in this lawyering process as a source of fact and a means of fact
management.
To the extent that social science has been so used, it has been inte-
grated into primary legal authorities. This integration is a part of legal
process; it changes social science. Social science is then not any more
separate from the law than the material facts of a particular case are
from its holding, or legislative facts or intent are from the statute.
After exploring the history and use of nonlegal materials, the few
reported patterns of use, and theories of learning, this Article concludes
first, that in generalist education for the practice of law social science is
most effectively taught as it appears in primary legal sources: cases,
statutes, and administrative materials. Social science materials supple-
ment these, but should be used not with the goal of instilling insight in
a distinct system of knowledge, but rather insight into the legal process
itself. Second, the case method, defined as intensive critical analysis of
primary legal sources, is an effective and manageable means of inte-
grating social science in law teaching.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO INTEGRATE SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN LEGAL EDUCATION
The reason little progress is evident in integrating social science in
legal education is the failure to move beyond the recognition of the
importance of social science for law and legal education to a refined
criterion of relevance. Proponents of social science instruction gener-
ally advocate wholesale incorporation of social science in its own frame
of reference or system of meaning. The early legal realist experiments,
however, illustrate the folly of lack of attention to the differences be-
tween the goals of education for the profession of law and social sci-
ence. Contemporary advocates of practical skill training also reject
wholesale incorporation as too academic or theoretical.
Broadening legal studies to include nonlegal materials, drawn
primarily from the social sciences, was part of the movement known as
legal realism and was a lively reform issue in the 1920s and 1930s. It
was part of both an attempt to entirely reorganize the curriculum at
Columbia University Law School in 1926-28 in light of social and eco-
nomic functions of law, and an institute founded in 1928-29 to foster
[Vol. 59:809
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empirical interdisciplinary research at Yale.' It was a departure from
the view that law was a conceptually autonomous science whose mas-
tery did not require insight from without so that other culturally desira-
ble learning was irrelevant to law study and a lawyer's work.3 Yet even
as the philosophical development of realism and its reformist political
side flowered, the particular emphasis on incorporation of social sci-
ence into both legal curriculum and scholarship slowly died down. The
Yale research attempt slowly descended to virtual inactivity by
approximately 1935 to 1939.1 The pace of reform moderated at Co-
lumbia by 1930.1
In 1955, Brainerd Currie diagnosed the cause of Columbia's inability
to carry out reform as lack of a sharp perception of the purpose served
by social science materials in a law curriculum.6 Currie concluded that
the movement failed and that legal education in 1955 remained largely
as it had been twenty years earlier. Although casebooks were entitled,
"Cases and Materials," the study of law nevertheless remained the
study of appellate court opinions without integration of social science
2. The Columbia activity is summarized and analyzed in Currie, The Materials of Law
Study, reprintedin AALS CURRICULUM STUDY PROJECT COMMITTEE, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW: 1971 [hereinafter cited as CARRINGTON REPORT], 1971 AALS PRO-
CEEDINGS Pt. 1, Sec. II, 184 app. (A. Cullison ed. 1971), reprinted in H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH,
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 267-318 (1972). Subsequent citations to the Carrington
Report and its appendices are to H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH supra. For a historical study of the
Yale institute, see Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459 (1980).
3. Well-chronicled historical embodiments of this latter view in legal education include
Story's establishment at Harvard of a university law school with a narrow curriculum embodying
vocational preparation by synthesis of authoritative legal materials without philosophical or insti-
tutional considerations. Langdell's case method provided further reason to confine the scope of a
law course to authoritative legal materials. Rooted in Pound's sociological jurisprudence, the le-
gal realists' reaction against the Story and Langdell precedents logically entailed use of nonlegal
materials in legal education and scholarship.
4. Schlegel, supra note 2, at 567-69.
5. Currie, supra note 2, at 269, 312-15.
6. Id at 317.
Goals at Columbia varied among providing: (1) a descriptive background in which legal doc-
trine operates; (2) a detailed account of human behavior, (3) accumulation of knowledge relevant
to such social institutions as the family; and (4) facts upon which to base solution of social
problems, such as the cause of crime or the efficacy of laws. The ambitious goals led to disap-
pointment with both the knowledge social science had to offer and its failure to provide standards
for criticism. The demise of the empirical research effort at Yale has been ascribed, in part, to its
originators' goals of utilizing research for the agenda of progressive reform politics in the pre-war
period. Schlegel, supra note 2, at 581-82. Again, social science proved disappointing because it
did not quickly yield facts upon which to base reform, and because as it grew in respectability as a
university discipline, it became more scientific and less tied to reform politics. Id at 586.
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materials.7
Since Currie's statement, the status of the movement that he called
an "epochal event" in legal education is largely undocumented. The
Columbia experience illustrated a vast curricular reform project; the
Yale story is of a major interdisciplinary research project. The story of
the more refined use of social science materials, called for by Currie in
the conclusion of his historical study of the Columbia experiment, is
scarcely mentioned in literature on legal education. In teaching a fairly
traditional substantive law course, that is, one organized not by social
science categories but by legal subject matter, Currie urged that teach-
ers call attention to the relevance of social science to law as an instru-
ment for or impediment to social goals.' Legal educators still need to
clarify precisely when and where social science is relevant in a law
course in a generalist curriculum and how to implement that concept.
Both tasks must overcome the theory versus practice, education for pol-
icy formulation versus practitioner training dispute in legal education.9
III. APPARENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN INTEREST AND
IMPLEMENTATION IN PRESENT INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN LEGAL EDUCATION
A. Descrition of Present Integration
A 1978 survey of trends in American legal education by E. Gordon
Gee and Donald Jackson does not include use of social science materi-
als within standard legal curricula.1" Instead, use of nonlegal materials
appears under the heading "Interdisciplinary Training," a subject that
includes joint degree programs; law course offerings that emphasize be-
havioral or social science skills, such as law and literature, life sciences
and law, law and economics, law and education; and special research
7. Currie, supra note 2, at 269. This statement was made eight years after Professors Lass-
well's and McDougal's ambitious effort to conceptualize systematic training for lawyers as public
policy makers, which stressed empirical explanation of values, but used broad value concepts that
did not employ legal language or the specific categories of social science. See Lasswell & McDou-
gal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J.
203 (1943).
8. Currie, supra note 2, at 308, 317.
9. See generally Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap. Legal Education and Lawyer Compe-
tency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 695, 928, 961-62 (1977).
10. Gee & Jackson, supra note 9, at 874-77. The Gee and Jackson article both summarizes
and epitomizes the scanty available literature that describes use of social science materials in legal
education.
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projects that require use of university resources outside the law school.
Although the authors conclude that this type of program innovation
has been relatively unsuccessful, they emphatically assert the move-
ment will and should grow." The reason given for slow growth in in-
terdisciplinary programming is its mixed reception among legal
educators, resulting from "the existing policy split between academi-
cians and practitioners."1 2 Interest in and recognition of social sci-
ence's relevance exists, but there are few signs of significant program
reform.' 3
A 1973 survey of the number of law school classroom hours in be-
havioral science and the teaching approach employed reported findings
consistent with those of Gee and Jackson.1 4  This sequel to earlier
surveys conducted in 1931 and 1948 found that interest in teaching be-
havioral subjects remained high, and the number of law schools teach-
I1. Id at 877. Without citation to empirical data, they state "reality dictates" such growth
"as a closer nexus between law and other allied disciplines naturally develops," and because of
recognition that law is not made in, nor can the lawyer be trained in, "a social vacuum."
12. Id at 876. Gee and Jackson were struck by repeated emergence of this debate, between
"practical" versus "theoretical" orientations, in all decision making about legal education..
13. Reports focus on broader or formal interdisciplinary training: joint degree programs,
joint faculty appointments, elective courses on law and "blank,"-a fill-in-the-blank for social
science generally, or economics, sociology, or psychology. See, eg., Lovett, Economic Analysis and
its Role in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 385 (1974); Mazor, The Materials ofLaw Study:
1971, CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 319; Zusman, Law and the Behavioral Sciences-
Revisited" A Third Survey of Teaching Practices in Law Schools, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 544 (1973).
As Gee and Jackson assert, interdisciplinary programming appears to be a visible innovation, but
not a major one, nor one significantly affecting the structure of legal education. Accord, D. JACK-
SON & E. GEE, BREAD AND BUTTER?; ELECTIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1975); My-
ers, Education of Present and Future Lawyers, printed in M. SCHWARTZ, LAW AND AMERICAN
FUTURE 179, 184-85 (1976). An example is a trend in increased elective economic theory courses,
e.g., "Economics and Law." Lovett, supra. The trend, however, was an increase from four to 18
law schools teaching such courses, and included five leading institutions and 10 "national" law
schools. id at 389, 415. The study was limited to a sampling of leading national law schools.
Identifying major innovations in legal education for a recent symposium, Murry Schwartz gives
more impressionistic support for the conclusion that interdisciplinary materials have not had a
significant effect on legal education. He states that "law" and "blank" courses appear to be re-
sponses to changes in the outside world, but could disappear tomorrow and leave only a small
residue. They have had little influence upon the fundamental structure of legal education.
Schwartz, How can Legal Education Respond to Changes in the Legal Profession?, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 440, 441-43 (1978). Another impressionistic description in agreement with Schwartz on this
point is Sparer, The Responsibility oLaw Teachers, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 602 (1978).
14. Zusman, supra note 13. Behavioral science in the survey included sociology, psychology,
psychiatry, and economics, and was defined as "scientific disciplines which use recorded observa-
tions to study individual and collective human behavior for the purposes of prediction and con-
troL" Id at 546.
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ing them increased. However, the number of hours in required classes
remained very small and the number of optional or elective courses
were not much greater. The main teaching approach focused on tech-
nical legal knowledge or applications such as cross-examination tech-
nique, rather than a general, or philosophical approach. The study
concludes that there is disparity between acceptance in principle of be-
havioral science as suitable for legal study and the practice of making
little room for it in the curriculum.
The few studies that attempt to look at integration of nonlegal mater-
ials with legal ones within a standard law course, rather than a interdis-
ciplinary program, give an incomplete and mixed picture. Studies
stressing economics or quantitative skills report their relatively high de-
gree of integration in the legal curriculum. 5 The use of economics in
courses beyond traditional ones such as antitrust and trade regulation
has spread; theory rather than study or use of quantitative methodol-
ogy is the emphasis.'6
15. Economics appears to be the special case. A report of a 1973-74 survey by the American
Association of Law Schools to identify teachers who used economics or empirical studies in their
teaching indicated a substantial increase in the use of economics directly in law courses. Lovett,
supra note 13. Most frequent was nearly universal use in the predictable areas of antitrust and
trade regulation, but it was spread, in less significant numbers, to the whole gamut of legal educa-
tion. There are examples in contracts, torts, and property, although it is more noteworthy in areas
with a legislative and administrative base, e.g., tax, securities, and corporations. Lovett's study
was confined to 22 "national" schools and 50 "stronger" regional schools. Forty percent of Amer-
ican law schools offered at least one course involving use of quantitative methods, primarily in
traditional areas of antitrust, regulated industries, and accounting, but also in computer science
and statistics, according to a 1978 survey. White & Stone, Quantitative Methods and the Legal
Profession, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 672 (1978).
16. See Lovett, supra note 13, at 399. White & Stone, supra note 15, conclude there is no
evidence of a present shift to increased emphasis on quantitative methods.
Disparity between interest and implementation was noted by Mazor in a 1971 update of Cur-
rie's survey. Mazor, supra note 13. Mazor observed the contradiction between legal educators'
statements of need for social science in legal study at the 1969 Annual Association of American
Law Schools Meeting, and an observed shortage of interdisciplinary law school activity. The
proceedings are published in 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1970). The conference topic was "Social
Research and the Law." Mazor's questionnaire to law faculty showed high interest in representa-
tion of other disciplines in faculty appointments. The interdisciplinary activity in which they
engaged most frequently was assignment to students of materials from other disciplines. Formal
interdisciplinary programs were rated as the lowest factor that fostered interdisciplinary activity,
the nature of subject matter highest. Very few teachers said they engaged or planned to engage in
interdisciplinary research.
The latter finding is consistent with other indications of lack of interest. If research by law
teachers is an indicator of teaching interest, the forecast for use of social science materials looks as
though it may be improving, though at a very modest rate. A 1971 survey that showed the modest
fraction of approximately one-sixth of all full time law teachers at least occasionally conduct
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/8
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B. Dichotomy Between Theoretical and Practical
Orientations Generally
The finding of the studies that action has lagged far behind interest
may be relevant to the present status of more refined interdisciplinary
effort in teaching materials. A reason given for lack of implementation
is the policy split between theoretical, policy education and practitioner
training that Gee and Jackson reported among legal educators. This
dispute is between proponents of technical training of practitioners in
legal doctrine and skills, and advocates of academic education of law-
yers to a more theoretical understanding of law, legal institutions, and
lawyers' roles in the larger society. 17
The 1971 Carrington Report on Legal Education described tension
and conflict in the dual obligation of promoting academic and profes-
sional excellence; it urged recognition of their interdependence and
equal importance.' 8 Yet, the tension remains, even in the common cur-
ricular mix of most national law schools.' 9 Gee and Jackson found
increasing support for the emphasis on practical training by students,
judges, and practitioners in 1978. They conclude that the more
theoretical elements of legal education must be proven useful to stu-
dents in achievement of their professional goals.20
Tension between academic and professional aspects of legal educa-
tion may be inevitable; it may also be creative. Nevertheless, it can
lead to hardening of positions on educational policy in a manner that
obstructs flexibility and clarification of the purpose of legal education.
Lack of a clear educational purpose may underlie the malaise among
law students and teachers reported by Packer and Erlich in their 1972
Carnegie Commission Report on Legal Education. They reported con-
fusion and discontent about goals and methods in the second and third
"nontraditionar' research, most of which involves some use of the scientific method, showed great
change from virtually no sociological research by law teachers previously. Cavers, Non-Tradi-
tional Research by Law Teachers: Returnsfrom the Questionnaire of the Council on Law-Related
Studies, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 534, 543 (1972). In 1978 not more than 20% of law teachers believed a
background in quantitative skills aided substantially in publishing, and 70% would not do joint
research with someone who had such a background. White & Stone, supra note 15, at 673. From
these studies, it appears that empirical research employing scientific method by legal scholars may
slowly increase, but is likely to employ observation or descriptive techniques that do not stress
quantitative skills.
17. See CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 2, 93, 127; Gee & Jackson, supra note 9, at 928.
18. CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 127.
19. Gee & Jackson, supra note 9, at 927.
20. Id at 961-62.
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years of law school, law professors' roles as teachers in a graduate
academy or a professional training school, and the character of legal
scholarship as purely doctrinal or empirically based."1 Dissension may
result not in a creative tension, but a "fractionalized conception of legal
education as a system of diverse and conflicting educative elements." 22
Such a conception does not lead educators to integrate skills, theories,
and perspectives creatively, but to stress certain ones to the exclusion of
others.
C. Social Science Integration and the Theoretical versus
Practical Tension
1. The Early Realist Experiments
The tension is by no means new. Similar tensions in professional
and educational identity characterized the progressive or social realism
movement of the 1930s, of which attempts to assimilate social science
materials into the legal curriculum were a part.
The Langdellian concept of law as a closed system of universal prin-
ciples, fully extractable from appellate cases alone, had been altered by
the 1930s. 23 Nevertheless, perhaps due to Story's narrow legal curricu-
lum at Harvard and the role of precedent in common law, the doctrine
contained in cases remained the content of legal education. The legal
realists challenged that remnant of the Story-Langdellian model of le-
gal education as too divorced from social fact, too tied to a "transcen-
dent" notion of law at odds with the new sociological jurisprudence.
Use of social science in legal education was the logical pedagogical co-
rollary to their notion of law as means to social ends.
The realists stressed the empirical research techniques of social sci-
21. H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 33. See also Woodward, The Limits of Legal
Realism: .ln Historical Perspective, in H. PACKER & T. EHRLIcH, supra note 2, at 331. Woodward
discusses current frustration and tension in terms of the "secularization" of law. He describes
tension among those who feel it has gone too far, and those who feel it has not gone far enough.
Id at 332-48.
22. Holmes, supra note 1, at 562.
23. Reed, Trainingfor the Public Profession of Law, reprinted in CARRINGTON REPORT, supra
note 2, at 164. Langdell himself had to admit that the case system, as opposed to the case method,-
had failed. He maintained nevertheless that law study must remain in the university as an aca-
demic pursuit, but its materials could expand beyond appellate cases. The aim of legal education
and the rationale for use of the case method thus had changed by the time Professor Ames gave
the case method rationale in 1913 as training a legal mind, rather than mastery of a systematic
body of principles. Holmes, supra note 1, at 556-57.
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ence, and in their rather cynical view of substantive content, seemed to
equate law with method.24 Emphasis on social science's method, rather
than legal method, separates them from practitioner training advocates
of today. Those faculty who opposed reorganization of Columbia's
curriculum in terms of social function had practical concerns. They felt
the absence of technical analysis of doctrine and historical orientation.
Some faculty and alumni feared creation of a social science research
institute rather than education for a practical profession.25 They also
felt constraints on the amount of material a course or curriculum could
absorb. Contrary to expectations, restructure of the curriculum by so-
cial function did not simplify, reduce duplication of, or yield greater
room for nonlegal materials.26 These educators displayed concern sim-
ilar to that shared by practitioner critics today. Their concern was to
conserve education for a particular profession, marked in part by a par-
ticular concept, a history, a body of knowledge, and a method.
The realists urged that legal studies be tied to action; in this sense
they were practically oriented. In addition to a sociological jurispru-
dence in which legal thought could not be divorced from the economic
or social order, they emphasized education in practical lawyering
skills.2 7 For many, the motivation for their research efforts was polit-
ical reform agenda.28 Their stress of nonlegal materials to teach practi-
cal lawyering contrasted with the dominant view that other disciplines
had little to do with technical aspects of a lawyer's work. Their practi-
cal skill emphasis was on public law tasks and reform, consistent with
the idea that legal education should be for a public profession of law,
public service, and decision making, rather than service of individual
clients.29
24. Woodward characterizes the realists' concept of law, which underlay their revolt against
the case method, as applied science based on practical considerations, law as technique or the
administration of power rather than a science of principles. See Woodward, supra note 21, at 360-
62.
25. Currie, supra note 2, at 312-13.
26. ld at 315-16.
27. Holmes, supra note 1, at 559-60 (quoting Llewellyn, On What's Wrong with So-Called
Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 658 (1935), and J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 227
(1949)).
28. Schlegel, supra note 2,passim. Examples are Clark's focus on usefulness for reform in
research on federal court procedures, id at 517, and Douglas' business failures project. Both
pursued active advocacy of their respective reform goals after falling away from empirical re-
search. Id at 585.
29. See generally Reed, supra note 23.
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Thus, use of social science materials involved three related issues of
professional and educational identity: could classroom legal education
of intellectual skills incorporate social science and still serve aspirants
to the legal profession who desired learning in the law, rather than
learning about law; should and could practical skills be taught; and
were private practitioners or public servants the desired product?
The issues are similar to the contemporary theory versus practice de-
bate that has plagued recent interdisciplinary program efforts. Indeed,
some assert that the debate has not been modified substantially for over
fifty years.3 This appears to be true, at least in that aspect of the ten-
sion that pits individual client and public service orientations against
one another. Whether time and space constraints limit social science
instruction, and whether social science is peripheral to teaching law
also remain unresolved issues.
2. More Recent Integration
The atomist versus public service debate has continued to character-
ize discussion of social science in the legal curriculum.31 One view,
reminiscent of those opposed to Columbia's early curricular reform, is
that social science is too theoretical and abstract and that its acquisition
is too expensive in time and money for its limited relevance to the prac-
tical concerns of private practice.32 Knowledge of social science has
little immediate effect in practice: it does not effect the amount of work
one can take on, and lack of it is not apparent if one can handle the
legal issues. Neither judges nor legislators reward such knowledge and
few opponents capitalize on its absence.
The practitioner training view Gee and Jackson found among
judges, students, and practitioners was often that of the private practi-
tioner: the professional that serves primarily personal interests of indi-
vidual clients, not the public. 33 Lawyers therefore need not predict for
30. Auerbach, What Has the Teaching of Law to do with Justice?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457
(1978).
31. At the 1969 American Law Schools Annual Meeting on Social Science and Law,
Auerbach felt that meeting's lack of focus was due to diverse conceptions of the type of lawyer
being educated. Auerbach, Perspective: Division of Labor in the Law Schools and Education of
Law Teachers, 23 J. LEGAL EDuC. 251 (1970). Although he concluded no single lawyer type
could be the model, the diversity still appears to inhibit conception of the role of social science
materials and method in the legal curriculum.
32. Gee & Jackson, supra note 9, at 874-77.
33. In describing this phenomenon, Gee and Jackson may be overlooking significant con-
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collective decision making, but for private planning; legal impediment
or incentive to private goals, not social ends, is their concern. Knowl-
edge of the law, of doctrine and the relationship of laws, is what law
school should impart. Social science that treats laws as social facts
designed to influence behavior does not yield knowledge of law's inter-
relationships on their own terms so much as the "how" and "why."
Even its generation of empirically based predictions for alternative
courses of action generally is not keyed to individuals' behavior or to
highly specific choices.
Responsibility to the profession and adherence to democratic values
among legal educators gives some support to this view in the 1970s
version of the debate. According to this position, the profession has
necessarily become more involved in public aspects of law and more
diverse, so that legal education finds a student without clear profes-
sional goals.34 Nevertheless, if the professional is to remain open to
various groups in society and responsive to a perceived unmet need for
legal services, the cost of legal education must be minimized, both in
terms of tuition and time investment .3  To the extent that the integra-
tion of social science into a generalist curriculum demands extra money
for additional faculty, faculty research, or student class hours, it fails
the cost-benefit test.
Among legal educators who share these views are firm proponents of
social science integration in legal education, and they have made val-
iant proposals to tie the integration to practitioner competence. An ex-
ample is the 1971 Carrington Report on Legal Education, which has
been characterized as representative of a consensus among legal educa-
tors.36 It strongly affirms the importance of setting legal principles in
social context, assessing the limits and possibilities of social science
methodology, and appreciating law related disciplines. Social science
in the Carrington Report model is included in a standard J.D. curricu-
lum for a generalist degree. The Carrington Report is sensitive to the
need to justify the function of curricular requirements to the profession,
trary "practioner" opinion. Not only legislators, but appellate courts, perceive the relevance of
social science to practical decisions. Judge Irving Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit wrote recently that most observers today would include in a judge's curric-
ulum vita study of economics, sociology, and psychology, and selected sciences as well. Kaufman,
Charting a Judicial Pedigree, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, § 1, at 23, col. 4 (city ed.).
34. See generally H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 5-21.
35. See, e.g., CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 127-28.
36. H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 48-49.
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and to decrease cost. As did the early Columbia experiment, it aban-
dons doctrinal curricular classifications; it attempts to avoid the pitfall
of those reformers by using classifications related to the functions of a
competent lawyering process rather than social functions of law, espe-
cially in the basic core of instruction.3 7 Lack of response to the Report
in terms of observable curricular change illustrates again the gap be-
tween interest and action in incorporating social science in legal educa-
tion, and also the contemporary theoretical/practical skill policy split's
effect on the earlier controversy.38 Not only is social science too theo-
37. First, the Report is a call for total curricular revamping, a broad proposal for social sci-
ence integration rather than a detailed solution to the particular problem of social science's rele-
vance to a legal subject area or to a legal problem. As such, it is vulnerable to the criticism Gee
and Jackson found among practicing lawyers, judges, and private practice bound students. The
main social policy course in the generalist curriculum, Law and Social Control, appears superflu-
ous to the everyday concerns of representing individual clients. Its content is public law related:
crime and racial discrimination. While knowledge of law's broader social setting is relevant to
private practice, its appearance in a course separate from courses in legal doctrine and method,
decision making and planning, and the intensive instruction in specific law subjects, implicitly
lends credence to the charge that it is largely peripheral. Social and economic milieu and under-
pinnings of law are mentioned in the other course descriptions. However, no detailed description
is offered of how such perspectives are to be transmitted or with what material. More scientific,
data based scholarship is left to graduate instruction. While this answers charges that actual per-
formance of social science research is too time consuming and costly for generalist education, it
leaves unclear just what social science content the generalist curriculum should include.
Although the Report and its curricular recommendations use significance for practitioner func-
tioning as its criterion, it is nevertheless vulnerable to criticism by the practitioner training advo-
cates. It does not give a clear or specific link between social science materials and the materials of
private practice: cases, statutes, and regulations. Because of its lack of specific correlation to
practice, its inclusion of social science appears unjustified, however desirable in general education,
especially if it adds expense to generalist education. Ironically, social science, the realists' tool to
enliven overly conceptual, abstract legal education, is opposed today in the name of practicality as
too theoretical. The Report thus provides evidence for the charge that legal educators tend to
think too universally in attempts to respond to changes in the outside world and the profession. It
leaves unanswered Currie's appeal for refined integration of social science materials within partic-
ular law courses.
38. In the proceedings of the 1969 American Association of Law Schools Meeting on Social
Science and Law, Carlin took the position that social science and its methods should have a very
modest role in legal education, and could not aid it in its major task, determination of which issues
lawyers should explore. Carlin, Graduate Programsfor Which Law Faculties Haye No Responsibil-
ity, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1970).
Auerbach echoes this sentiment in 1978-the issue of which social consequences lawyering
should promote is neglected by social science's emphasis on empirical method over values and
beliefs. Auerbach, supra note 30, at 474. Those legal scholars who scoffed at social science's
unsuitability to assist lawyers in answering pressing social problems in the 1960s and 1970s found
company among professional sociologists who believed professional social scientists should be
involved in social policy decisions and abandon attempts to be value-free in research. See, e.g., D.
HoRowrrz, RADICAL SOCIOLOGY: AN INTRODUcON (1971). In parallel fashion, realist dis-
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retical for those concerned with "bread and butter" education, but also
for those who have followed the realists' commitment to legal educa-
tion's role in formulating practical social reforms.39
D. Some Conclusions
Currie described the movement to introduce social science materials
as possibly one of the few epochal events in the history of American
legal education.40 By 1971, Mazor's update of Currie's work suggests
"other movements may yet come to overshadow it," noting "a felt con-
tradiction" between legal educators' interest and action.4 ' In 1978,
Schwartz does not mention social science content or any interdiscipli-
nary activity when he lists the only two major changes he perceives in
legal education: clinical programs and greater demographic spread in
the student body. Law school courses purporting to apply social sci-
ence to law have not affected the legal profession or the structure of
legal education, he asserts.4 2
Schwartz's statement gives two clues to what happened to the vigor
of the social science integration movement. First, social science study
may have been overshadowed largely by the advent of clinical legal
education. The realists' practical orientation and their commitment to
public policy law reform tasks is largely missing in today's discussion
of social science materials. It appears to be accepted that the reform
agenda of activist legal educators is not served as well by social science
instruction as by actual participation in reform through litigation and
legislative drafting. Practitioners who are not committed to the goals of
reform oriented clinics also find value in the skills training and the
"real world" dimension that clinical education provides.
Apart from practical application, the need to allow social and eco-
enchantment with social science in the 1930s coincided with a shift in sociology between 1920 and
1940 from earlier public policy allegiance to a more nearly pure science, that is, one as objective
and value free as possible. P. HORTON & C. HUNT, SOCIOLOGY 34 (5th ed. 1980); Schlegel, supra
note 2, at 581.
39. Professionals in sociological reasearch often only aggravate the reservations of fellow
legal educators. For instance, Hans Zeisel, a legal educator esteemed as a pioneer in sociological
research, urged that sociological research should be pursued as a science for its own sake, and had
in reality very little to do with legal decision making-even public policy oriented decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Zeisel, comments at the Assessment Conference, Developments in
Law and Social Science Research, 52 N.C.L. REv. 969, 993 (1974).
40. Currie, supra note 2, at 267.
41. Mazor, supra note 13, at 319.
42. M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13.
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nomic knowledge to permeate intellectual study of law is as pressing
today as in the 1930s. However, clinical programs remove the pressure
on classroom teachers to teach social science, at least that pressure
which sprang from reform advocacy or a perceived need to enliven
doctrinal educational approaches with incorporation of social or eco-
nomic data from the outside world. The perceived sterility of abstract,
doctrinally oriented classroom materials can be alleviated to some ex-
tent through encounter with flesh and blood in a clinical experience.
Clinical programs removed the impetus to integrate social science in
the functions of a generalist curriculum. In the sense of being il-suited
to immediate practical application, social science may appear as theo-
retical as the conceptually closed, doctrinal content of legal education
in the 1930s. Social science, in fact, may appear worse: theory or doc-
trine is admittedly law or a part thereof, while social science materials
often are about law. To the practitioner, activist law reformer, or the
teacher seeking to reduce materials, social science laws appear best re-
served to academicians and graduate curricula.
The latter point pertains to Schwartz's second clue. Law and social
science offerings, he states, have had no impact upon the structure of
legal education or the legal profession. He concludes that the persistent
form of legal education may indicate something worthy of preserva-
tion. The practitioner training view, whose criterion is relevance in
practice, substantiates this conclusion in part. The profession's demand
for practical competency does not embrace social science materials, but
at least implicitly rejects them in favor of learning in the law: cases,
statutes, and administrative materials, the largely traditional teaching
resources. Broad curricular reform, such as the Carrington Report,
leaves this point unaddressed-the specific relation between the materi-
als of practice and social science teaching materials.
Closer examination shows that the viewpoints of the clinical enthusi-
ast and traditionalist may not be opposed to legal education's attention
to social science, but rather allied with Currie's call for refined integra-
tion of social science materials by individual teachers within the stan-
dard law curriculum. In addition to clinical education's preemption of
practical application, use of social science may have been hampered by
lack of a precise criterion for its integration with legal materials and a
perception that its teaching materials would not be legal materials or
the materials of practice. To preserve the valuable and unique aspects
of legal education, as Schwartz urges, and provide learning in the law
[Vol. 59:809
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rather than theory about it, as the practitioner viewpoint urges, the
materials of law study should be the raw materials of the law: cases,
statutes, administrative regulations, pleadings, legislative histories, and
administrative decisions and interpretations. Social facts, and social
science as their source, are also basic components of the legal process.
Although legal materials are the unique raw materials of legal disci-
pline and scholarship, they are also the materials of legal practice.
Currie's call for refined integration of social science materials into
the content of law courses has not received much attention. This may
be due to the tendency of legal educators to think in terms of broad
curricular change, and a corresponding perception among practitioners
and educators that social science integration would be a costly addition
and would involve materials foreign to those of legal practice. It may
be due in part to clinical education's preemption of the practical skill
and practical law reform impetus of the early social science advo-
cates.43 Notably, none of these factors involves opposition to social sci-
ence on the philosophical notion of law that underlay the early
Langdell-Story approach to legal education. No one urges that law is
or should be an entirely abstract, conceptually self-contained study di-
vorced from economic and social realities. Social science is not per-
ceived as a threat to a concept of law so much as logistically difficult to
incorporate into education that is a prerequisite to a particular profes-
sional career. It is peripheral to an already full curriculum, costly in
proportion to its relevance to everyday private practice, and unsuitable
for immediate law reform action.
The issue of lawyer competency, which promises to replace availabil-
ity of legal services as a primary concern in the 1980s,44 is not apt to
provide greater motivation for social science incorporation in legal
study, as long as the conventional wisdom is that social science is a
valuable source of perspective, but too unwieldly to be relevant in any
integral sense to the practical profession of law.
43. An alternate explanation is that although larger curricular reforms are being debated and
clinical programs are absorbing both social idealists and more prosaic practical skill enthusiasts,
individual teachers have quietly compiled classroom materials that integrate social science into
traditional legal subject matter. To the extent that this has happened, it needs to be held up as
encouragement to other educators and to show sound or manageable approaches.
44. Smith, Conference in Houston Explores Lawyer Competence, President's Page, 66 A.B.A.
J. 1486 (1980).
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IV. A CRITERION FOR REFINED INTEGRATION OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE MATERIALS
A. Needfor Criterion Tied to Competent Practice
The historical experiments and the present lag between interest in
social science and its actual use suggest that the primary criterion for
integrating social science materials is relevance to the practice of law,
to the unique content of education for a particular profession. Such a
criterion addresses the practitioner side of the theory/practice debate in
legal education. It also recognizes social science's largely neglected,
sideline status in current legal education, a status resulting not from
opposition in principle, but inability to effectively act upon a felt need
for infusion of social science. Treatment of social science in broad in-
terdisciplinary programming as a subject relevant to but outside the
subject matter of law, taught largely with nonlegal materials, appar-
ently has had little effect on legal education. The better approach, as
Currie proposed, appears to be the difficult task of refined integration
in law courses, as part of the legal process.
The starting point for developing a criterion for that integration is a
description of the legal process as it is known to those operating from
within, rather than the observations of scientists unfamiliar with the
mechanism. An example is the Carrington Report, discussed previ-
ously. The Report notes a need for data based, social science research
to provide an intellectual underpinning for law, which may be a clue as
to why no detailed solution to social science integration in legal curric-
ula is offered. Its authors perceive the problem of social science's slow
integration and acceptance as an inability to induce practitioners to fol-
low scholars.45 Their solution is graduate instruction in social science
research for prospective teachers of a new generation of lawyers.
This solution, although expensive and slow, may partially alleviate
the perceived problem of practitioner apathy. It alone will not be an
adequate solution to the need for refined integration of social science in
generalist law curriculum.' It seems doomed to be ineffectual in light
of the historical concern for preserving education for a particular and
45. CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 2, at 147.
46. References to "practice of law" herein include broadly diversified legal activities: legisla-
five lobbying and drafting, counseling, and negotiation, as well as litigation. Nevertheless, the
following analysis centers largely on private practice of law, due to the sources of criticism in the
practitioner training side of the theory/practice debate, and on litigation or counseling which
relies on use of court and administrative cases.
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practical profession distinct from social science, the persistence and
strength of practitioner training critics, and the impatience of activists
in clinical programs.
The criterion for social science integration adopted by the Report for
generalist legal education was one of significant effect on practitioner
competence. To meet this criterion, the task of securing an intellectual
underpinning for law may not be to induce practitioners to adopt social
science scholarship. Rather it is to pay close attention to practitioners'
present use of social science, however crude, and consider how that
could be improved from the perspective of competent lawyering. To
respond best to the gap between interest in principle and actual integra-
tion of social science in legal education, the starting point is how com-
petent lawyers fumction,47 and only then how law courses in a standard
curriculum realistically can both transmit to students a critical appreci-
ation of present use of social science and affect that usage.
B. A Conceptual Basis for Practice Oriented Criterion of Integratioi"
Unjfed Competent Lawyering Capacities
An intellectual structure for the generalist curriculum drawn from a
description of interrelated capacities the able practitioner should pos-
sess is a helpful framework to specify how, where, and when social sci-
ence is or can be integrated into law from a practice point of view.
Legal education is, in this view, an interdependent spectrum of edu-
cative categories based on professional skills or capacities. 4 The cate-
gories range from the theoretical to the practical: legal perspective,
legal and nonlegal theory and information, legal dialectics, and finally,
legal operations.49 The list is both sequential and dynamic. It is se-
quential in that it moves from the teaching of concepts to use of partic-
ular facts. Thus legal perspective concerns the functions and purpose
of law, an evaluation of its means and ends, and an understanding of it
47. Accord, Mazor, supra note 13; Stolz, Trabngfor the Public Profe.rsion of Law (1921);A
Contemporary Review, reprMted in CARINGTON REPORT, Jupra note 2, at 227.
48. Holmes, supra note 1, develops this "unified concept" of legal education as a response to
Karl Llewellyn's challenge to educators to teach skills inadequately addressed by the traditional
case method, Llewellyn, The Place ofSkills in LegalEaication, 45 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 345 (1945). It
incorporates in an index format previous attempts to conceptualize education for lawyer opera-
tions. See Redmount, A Conceptual Fiew of the Legal Education Process, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129
(1972); Rutter, A Jursprudence ofLawyers' Operations, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301 (1961); Strong,
Pedagogcal Implications on Inventor yng Legal Capacities, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 555 (1951).
49. Holmes, supra note 1, at 562-65 and accompanying appendix at 578-80.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
826 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
as a particular type of method. At this stage there is little concern with
facts other than collective facts such as social or historical context. Per-
tinent operative facts are treated generally in the second category, legal
information, although as incidental to its primary focus on conceptual
analysis of legal doctrine and legal and nonlegal theory. Legal dialec-
tics is analyzing, distinguishing, reconciling and synthesizing legal
materials: case, statutory and administrative. It includes logic and fact
sensitivity, and appreciation of the factual component, "type facts," in
legal rules. Finally, practical skills, in the category of legal operations,
employ particular facts.
Especially significant from the viewpoint of social science integration
in this spectrum is the source of unity among the categories in the pro-
cess of fact management. 50 Each category draws upon this underlying
set of skills. The basic components of fact management are fact assimi-
lation and implementation. Fact assimilation is ordering of undifferen-
tiated factual mass by discovery of factual relationships and by forging
facts into a cohesive whole. Fact ascertainment is discovery: it in-
cludes both fact finding and fact development through reliability and
relevance testing. Fact differentiation and selection is forging a com-
plex yet cohesive whole. It is done by diagnosis of the problem, dis-
cernment of the law or doctrine that fits the facts, consideration of
advocacy and of suitability to a specific legal task. Implementation log-
ically follows assimilation in fact management, but also augments
processs of selection and differentiation. It includes the operations of
drafting, legal advocacy, and persuasive argumentation.
Fact management's role as a unifying, underlying stream for the edu-
cative categories is significant for social science's role in legal educa-
tion. Evident in it is the early realists' insistence that: (1) law is not a
closed body of static knowledge, a unity of principles, but an activity, a
method, a process that includes finding, selecting, and presenting facts;
and (2) the activity takes place in the world of social and economic
realities rather than a theoretical heaven of concepts. Legal doctrine
and theory shape fact management and limit incorporation of social
fact, yet the range of factual inquiry goes far beyond examination of
narrow facts set as those that define a legal principle. Social fact per-
meates the legal process because fact management underlies each ca-
pacity. In legal perspective, there is factual description of the social
50. Id at 562.
[Vol. 59:809
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/8
LEGAL EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
context of legal functions and identification of shared societal values
underlying nonlegal and legal theories. In dialectical reasoning, facts
are quantified, verified, or perceived in a new causal relationship that
may shatter legal logic or sharpen the opposition of one principle to
another.
The sequential nature of the lawyering capacities lies not only in in-
creasing attention to particular facts, increasingly concentrated factual
consideration, but also in the incorporation of each category into subse-
quent ones. The student and practitioner employ legal perspective, le-
gal information, and legal dialectics in performing a legal operation.
For instance, to determine which facts are to be elicited at a client in-
terview (operation), one must know the doctrinal area of law or the rule
under which relief might be sought (information), appreciate how the
rule varies by factual context (dialectics), and use perspective, e.g., is
the client's problem one suitable for legal resolution?
This version of the subject matter of legal education bridges the op-
posing theory and practice orientations in legal education. Doctrine is
not "theory" in the sense of abstract, purely conceptual principle. Its
mastery draws upon fact management skills: relevance in fact develop-
ment, definition, and discernment in fact differentiation and selection.
It is integral to legal operations as well as to legal dialectics. The unify-
ing empirical principle of fact management, a process inherent in the
practice of law, changes the debate. The question for such educational
choices as materials and methods becomes what theoretical training is
useful to private practice and what is not.5'
This notion of legal education provides a conceptual basis upon
which to respond to Currie's call for refined integration of social sci-
ence materials in legal education.52 The competent lawyering concept
may help legal education avoid overly universal prescriptions and yet
51. Id at 572.
52. Holmes' description of the subject matter of legal education is part of his inquiry into
"functional" teaching method and materials. Because he is interested in practical skill acquisition,
an educational goal seemingly at odds with traditional teaching from appellate court cases, he
defines the case method broadly. In the unified concept of legal education that incorporates the-
ory and practical skill the case method is a valuable, though not exclusive, tool. Holmes' argu-
ment thus supports the proposition that the legal realists (and their contemporary counterparts), in
opposing the unduly abstract concept of law inherent in Langdellian education, went further than
necessary in abandoning cases as teaching materials, the case method's analytical approach, and
"fundamental" law subjects. Holmes' conceptualization of the subject matter of legal education
thus has implications for teaching methods and materials. Id
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respond to demands to further practitioner competency. The scheme
does so because it locates an intellectual framework for law in the legal
process itself, taking account of social and economic realities and non-
legal descriptions, but without looking to other disciplines for intellec-
tual underpinning. It avoids the early realists' overly inclusive embrace
of social science; it offers structure for the specificity the Carrington Re-
port lacks.
C. Educational Goals and Theory Implicit in the Conception
1. Insight as an Educational Goal
The dynamic character of the concept of interrelated educative cate-
gories based on lawyering capacities is particularly important for teach-
ing social science in law curricula. The unity of the concept is dynamic
both because the underlying unity of fact management is a process, and
because of the interdependence of the categories. Each is incorporated
into the next; each is prerequisite to competent performance of the
next. It is not, however, a one-way relationship. Legal operations draw
on the capacity for legal perspective, but also yield relevancy criteria
for that more theoretical search for law's social function. The catego-
ries are rooted in the process of fact management and held together in a
dynamic pattern of relationship. The pattern makes up that larger en-
tity, the competent practice of law.
The educational goal implicit in this version of lawyering is to impart
appreciation of that unity of dynamic interrelationship, to impart in-
sight. Acquisition of prescribed information or skills, that is, molding
or training a practitioner, is undeniably a goal of legal education. In
education for competent practice, however, it is only part of the larger
goal of obtaining insight. In contrast to molding or training, insight
concerns deeper, more complex structures of fact. It is understanding
gained by seeing a pattern of relationship or meaning.5 3
Insight results from well-performed legal reasoning and practice.
Legal reasoning, particularly in case analysis, is largely a synthesis of
53. These terms are drawn largely from J. Spencer, Learning (1968) (unpublished paper by
Professor Spencer at Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Michigan), which in turn draws upon Al-
fred North Whitehead's philosophy of education. See also Saxe, Legal Concepts and Applied
Social Research Concepts: Translation Problems, in M. SAKS & C. BARON, THE
UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL REsEAicH IN THE CounTs 169-72 (1980), in which the
term paraigm is used to describe social science and legal ways of viewing problems and of
thinking.
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holdings or rules into a unified whole that is applicable to new situa-
tions. Similarly, fact assimilation, which underlies legal reasoning and
all legal processes, is ordering an undifferentiated mass of facts into a
cohesive, complex whole. Only when facts are selected and differenti-
ated by a pattern of meaning, through use of problem definition, law
discernment and considerations of advocacy, do they have legal signifi-
cance. When a law professor or a judge asks for the facts, the insightful
answer is those facts that are material or relevant in their legal context.
Insight results when something is learned in context, when it takes on
significance in a system of meaning or fully developed theory. A par-
ticular holding has a causal pattern: it is made up of facts and rules. It
also has impact in a larger pattern of synthesized doctrine, of legal the-
ory, and of legal perspective. Similarly, a particular fact has causal
relationships to other facts and rules, or a case holding. Such patterns
of relationship hold particular facts, holdings, or concepts in compre-
hensible unity.
This is the source of intellectual excitement in common law analysis.
As case after case is dissected, the student sees the role of policy, prece-
dent, and fact in one holding, and the impact of that holding as a con-
stituent part of the next case or of a body of law. Particular cases, in
synthesis, are part of a larger formulation. In a pattern of relationship,
they have significance that they do not have apart.
The interplay of fact and doctrine is similar. Neither has full signifi-
cance apart from the other. Their real significance is as part of a sys-
tem of meaning. On one level, doctrine that results from the synthesis
of case holdings depends on facts: factual context and particular facts
of cases. In turn, the materiality of facts in a case turns on doctrine.
Theory and fact are held together in a pattern of relationship; the key
to learning is grasping the pattern, rather than a fact, a theory, or a
holding.
In the unified, dynamic theory of competent lawyering capacities, de-
scriptive factual knowledge underlies and frames theories of law's so-
cial function (perspective), and legal doctrine or theory (information).
Perspective and doctrine, employed in dialectical reasoning, provide
context or theory to make new fact situations legally intelligible. In
turn, application of doctrine to new facts may point up gaps in an origi-
nal premise, and require revisions of legal perspective or theory.
"Learning the law" then, is learning how these categories interact in a
pattern called legal process.
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Insight, therefore, is not gained solely through the category of legal
perspective. It is not separate from practical education, from molding
and training by imparting information and skills. Rather, practical
education is facilitated by relevant insights. In turn, facility in skills
and familiarity with information confer the freedom to explore new
patterns, and to gain deeper insight.
Insight is learning that changes the learner. It enables one to be
aware of a more complex, yet comprehensible context. The learner
who has gained insight has a changed conceptual framework with
which to approach new learning. Even after individual facts or ideas
have faded, the system of meaning in which their significance was
grasped remains, available for new learning.
The case method, when broadly defined as method applicable to
more than the study of appellate court cases, exemplifies this learning
process. The essence of the case method is systematic, intensive investi-
gation of the sources of law. Opinions and legislation are simultane-
ously the end-product of legal processes and building blocks in
continuing legal process. They are, therefore, examples of law's struc-
ture or pattern. The case method is guiding the student through origi-
nal sources, through the processes by which the law was developed. As
Dean Harlan Stone stated: "[B]y this method. . . the student make[s]
these concepts intellectually his own in such a way to be capable of
using and applying them."54
Given the impossibility of teaching the entirety of substantive legal
knowledge, the primary goal of imparting insight is a practical one-
even for those who urge primary emphasis on teaching the basic infor-
mation and skills a lawyer needs in everyday practice. It is practical
because the unifying meaning construct is the legal process. Insight
into this pattern yields ability to receive and use new information and
skills. Knowledge with no relevance to practice is taught futilely; being
outside the unifying pattern of education for lawyering, it stands slight
chance of being retained or applied.
2. Psychological Theories of Learning
Insight as an educational goal is consistent with certain psychological
theories of learning. Psychologists are far from agreement on a broad,
54. Remarks in Symposium--Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich Report, 4 AM. L.
SCH. REv. 91, 93 (1961).
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formal theory of learning with predictive value. At the same time,
however, more precise, empirical bases of prediction are often too nar-
row to have significance for the variety of students and subject matter
that characterizes legal education." Theorists are divided broadly
among those who interpret learning cognitively, as a way in which per-
ceptions or attitudes are modified by experience, and those who inter-
pret learning as a matter of connections between stimulus and
response. Varying both in the subject matter of their study and in
method, they nevertheless approach agreement on the proposition that
in learning a complex substantive matter, one may learn to learn. This
is accomplished either by cognitive restructuring, insight into a new
pattern, or by learning to discern what is constant and important in a
problem, what cues yield a problem solving approach transferable to a
new learning situation.5 6 These are exactly the goal of imparting in-
55. See generally W. HILL, LEARNING 253-59 (3d ed. 1977).
56. Gestalt psychology's contribution to learning theory is an emphasis on understanding or
perception of relationships within an organized whole. A gestalt, translated roughly from the
German as "form," "pattern," or "configuration," is a dynamic system in which parts are dynami-
cally interrelated so that the whole cannot be perceived or inferred from the separate parts. Id at
115. When a learner sees certain aspects in a new way, a way that involves understanding of
relationships or connections, he or she sees a situation as a single gestalt. Insight is the word for
this cognitive restructuring, which is commonly experienced as a feeling that one now "truly un-
derstands." Max Wertheimer's learning experiments, in which school children solved geometrical
problems, demonstrates insightful learning as cognitive restructuring. Id at 121-25 (discussing M.
WERTHEIMER, PRODUCTIVE THINKING (1945)). When mechanical application of a rule would not
suffice, conversion of the problem into a familiar one, or insightful restructuring into a better
gestalt, would. Logic does not necessarily produce insight; an inductively or deductively "correct"
answer may not be one that entails understanding a problem as an integrated whole, understand-
ing why the means led to the end. While prior learning or experience such as logical skills may be
essential to problem resolution, insightful restructure also uses an element of novelty to organize
material in a new manner or see it in a new system of meaning.
Insightful learning is especially resistant to forgetting and also is easy to transfer to new situa-
tions. Id at 117. Both phenomena may be due to the learner's changed situation. The new
perception that yields insight gives a sense of completion that aids retention. Good gestalts give a
unifying framework in which details that might otherwise be forgotten have a place and with
which one may approach new learning.
This gestalt explanation of original and flexible adult thinking is highly cognitive. Transfer of
learning approach is also found in connectionist theories of learning to learn, generally catego-
rized under the term, "mediating responses." Id at 171-79. According to this view, response to
original stimulus may mediate, or produce, stimulus for the final observable response. Mediating
responses serve as a cue or guiding stimulus for further behavior. In other words, a learner may
discover which cues (mediating responses) in a situation are significant and thus learn a general
method of problem solution that can be transferred to a new situation. A famous example is
Harlow's concept of "learning sets." Id (summarizing Harlow, Learning Set and Error Factor
Theor; printed in 2 S. KOCH, PSYCHOLOGY (1959)). Another variation is Tolman's concept of
"field cognition mode," a way of learning. An example is use of language as a mode for learning
Washington University Open Scholarship
832 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
sight by teaching legal process or competent lawyering.
Teaching transferable learning ability is of obvious value in educa-
tion for competence in an increasingly diverse legal profession in which
new problems are constantly encountered and substantive knowledge
becomes outdated. The goal of legal education might well be to impart
distinctive cue acquisition, in connectionist language, or perception of
an integrating learning approach, a unifying pattern among particulari-
ties of knowledge, in cognitive language. Such teaching must be more
than merely giving the cues, more than stating, "This is the pattern."
To gain insight, a student needs opportunities to experience a process,
an activity: restructuring information into a new pattern or formulat-
ing a learning approach.
The unified concept of competent lawyering outlined in Section B
above is a problem solving approach or unifying pattern that legal edu-
cation can convey. Cognitive restructuring that yields insight into the
system of meaning or context in which legal problems are resolved be-
comes the educational goal. The interdependence of the educative cat-
egories and the underlying unity of fact management skills yields a
pattern students can discern in legal materials and use to tackle new
problems, new learning situations. Because the educative categories
are rooted in lawyering capacities, the concept can serve as a bridge in
the theory versus practice dichotomy that characterizes formulation of
legal educational goals. Such a unified concept of the educational goal
could alleviate the emphasis of certain skills or perspectives to the ex-
clusion of others.
For present purposes, a unified concept of the content of legal educa-
tion can serve as a criterion for refined integration of particular subject
matter, such as social science, in the legal curriculum. Thus, competent
lawyering capacities and fact management skills provide a criterion for
determining where and when social science is most effectively inte-
grated with legal materials.
other things. Id at 174 n.135. When faced with a long series of different discrimination problems,
all of which can be solved in the same manner although no direct substantive learning can be
transferred from one to the next, learners gradually learn the generally applicable principle. Cer-
tain cues must be discerned as those yielding an approach to learning, a "learning set."
Responses to stimuli give learners cues, and cues can be complex and verbal. Mediating re-
sponses therefore resemble gestalts as learning modes; a gestalt might be interpreted m connec-
tionist theory as stimuli produced by a learner's own responses. Id at 175. Psychological learning
theorists thus do agree on the possibility and value of teaching transferable learning ability.
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V. UNIFIED LAWYERiNG CAPACITIES AS AN
INTEGRATIVE LEARNING PATTERN
A. A Pattern Distinct from that of Social Science
Fact management skill is a unifying substratum of competent law-
yering's educative categories. The educational categories of perspec-
tive, information, dialectics, and operations are unified by common
inclusion of fact assimilation and implementation. Accordingly, this
realm of empirical reality, which includes economic and social facts, is
an essential and fundamental part of the subject matter of legal educa-
tion. This much the early realists articulated.
Categories are also unified by interdependence in a process of law-
yering. Lawyering calls into play a general perspective, theory, doc-
trine and precedent, reasoning and practical skills. Competent
lawyering thus provides a basic defining criterion, a pattern of relation-
ship for legal education. It emphasizes process, the activities of law-
yers. In this respect, the competent lawyering concept is in contrast to
the criteria the realists at Columbia hoped to use to integrate new mate-
rial and redesign the legal curriculum. Their criteria were drawn from
social science, not legal process.
The difference is crucial for integration of social science in legal edu-
cation. While competent lawyering serves to unify and integrate di-
verse substantive matters, including social sciences, it also excludes. 57
Learning cannot be all-inclusive; learning distinctive cues for a particu-
lar problem solving approach involves learning to ignore other cues
and other information. In fact assimilation, the lawyer's task is order-
ing undifferentiated factual material. Ordering for and by the legal
process excludes other patterns of relationship; it leaves in the back-
ground discrete facts and factual relationships that could be prominent
in another perspective. What is integral to a social science perspective
on social reality may have far less weight in a legal one. The proper
function of law in society, a general perspective capacity and an educa-
tive category, may well limit or exclude discrete ideas and conceptual
relationships that are, in other contexts, quite valid. The social science
concept is not irrelevant, but its prominence in legal problem solving
57. To draw again on gestalt psychology in learning theory, a unified whole is also a segre-
gated whole; gestalts stand out as distinct from the background against which they appear. W.
HILL, jupra note 55, at 115.
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depends on its function in the pattern of relationship that is the legal
process.
Competent lawyering as an integrative learning pattern assumes
unique subject matter for legal education, insight not transmitted by
education in social science. The stubborn perseverance of legal educa-
tion's traditional structure, despite nearly unanimous appreciation
among legal educators of social fact and theory as components of law,
is some evidence for that assumption. While recognizing the signifi-
cance of shared subject matter-group behavior and interest in socially
effective results--differences between lawyering and social science are
the key to identifying social science's effective contribution to educa-
tion for competent lawyering.
Legal process and social science share concern with empirical knowl-
edge. They employ concepts with factual analysis to further knowledge
in a similar manner. They differ significantly in their sources and their
purposes. These differences shape their perception and treatment of
fact, their pattern of relationship for integrating factual information.
To limit analysis and highlight major contrasts, social science is de-
fined here in a conventional sense as a body of knowledge about life,
gained by the scientific method. Scientific method is testing a hypothe-
sis by scientific research: by systematic, controlled observation and
classification. Social science includes both findings or knowledge, and
method or the means of knowing. Legal process is the unified dynamic
of lawyering capacities described above, utilized within institutions that
have the power of official sanction, specifically, the courts.
Social science and law both depend upon knowledge about collective
or social behavior. Social science claims a body of organized, verified
knowledge secured through scientific investigation.58 In this aspect, it
is a science, distinct from social philosophy, a system of ideas and val-
ues. Yet concepts and theory cannot be completely divorced from sci-
entific knowledge. Formulation of concepts leads to increased
knowledge in a process that is in many ways similar to the interplay of
doctrine and fact in legal process. In social science fairly accurate de-
scriptive knowledge is necessary to frame an hypothesis, which is a
concept that is an explanatory pattern, that "holds" facts in a pattern of
relationship or system of meaning. Analysis, criticism and application
of the concept, or scientific research to verify the hypothesis, points up
58. P. HORTON & C. HUNT, supra note 38, at 10.
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gaps and errors in present knowledge. 9 In a similar manner, legal the-
ory rests on factual assumptions, legal doctrine incorporates facts, and
both are analyzed and critiqued in dialectical reasoning. Theoretical
inconsistency and errors in the factual premise may be corrected by
application to a new factual problem of new values, information, or
theories, either legal or nonlegal. Despite significant differences, social
science and law share empirical subject matter and a rational, system-
atic method of advancing knowledge by constant criticism of theory,
institutions, or assumptions.
Nevertheless, the disciplines differ in their source of truth and their
purpose. These differences result in different patterns that integrate
empirical and conceptual subject matter.
Social science's source of knowledge is ultimately scientific method.
Factual knowledge is descriptive statements that scientists agree are ac-
curate after controlled, scientific investigation,60 subject to revision in
light of new empirical investigation. In contrast to scientific authority,
law looks to humanistic authority as a source of truth. Humanistic au-
thority rests less on an empirical method of investigation than insights
of certain people and social groups. This is not to deny that method is
essential to assess the validity of legal knowledge, to determine what is
authoritative. Use of accepted modes of reasoning affects the strength
and validity of legal authority. Nevertheless, legal method varies from
scientific method in its use of humanistic authority. Who exercises le-
gal method, and by what societal authority, may determine the truth of
a legal statement.
The truth of a descriptive legal statement of present reality rests on
past societal agreement.6' The agreement may be a particular law, or
an agreement that a legal institution's decision will be enforced. Accu-
racy of sociological description of present reality depends on a method.
Moreover, the method requires the social scientist to attempt to stand
outside society, to observe as objectively as possible. The desired result
is a more accurate description, a fuller theory, which may be used to
predict or explain events. In legal process, the desired result is a so-
cially acceptable and workable ordering of present and future events-
problem resolution. The lawyer acts in society, in a special role en-
59. Id at 39.
60. Id at 7.
61. The phrase is from Moynihan, Social Science and the Courts, 54 PUB. INTEREST 12
(1979).
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trusted by societal agreement: legislator in the legislature, advocate or
decision maker in the courts or agencies, and counselor within the
framework of all these institutions. The advocate or decision maker
speaks by virtue of and within past societal agreement to persuade
other members of society that this is the agreement, or to pronounce
that it is with official sanction. As an actor within a social institution,
the lawyer's perspective is quite different from that of the social scien-
tist, for whom the lawyer's activity is an object of empirical inquiry.
Thus, each discipline's source of truth is integrally related to its func-
tion or purpose.
Precedent assumes an important role for one acting within the pa-
rameters of past agreement. As the theory of fact management in lawy-
ering process makes clear, legal precedent contains results of past
empirical inquiry and use of precedent in the continuing legal process,
and entails further fact management. Revision of knowledge is not,
however, as it is in social science, dependent solely on new empirical
evidence. This is because legal precedent embodies not only empirical
information, but past agreement and authoritative interpretation. Fact
management, the assimilation and implementation of empirical infor-
mation, underlies lawyering capacities, but the facts are held in a pat-
tern of relationship that rests on humanistic authority.
Past agreement as a source of authority for legal truth adds a norma-
tive dimension to legal perception and management of empirical real-
ity. New conclusions do not arise from new evidence necessarily,
however unwelcome they be, as in the scientific model. To the scientist,
precedent seems to require manipulation of factual findings that is dis-
honest or contrived; law appears to start with a conclusion and manipu-
late evidence to fit it.6" This appears obvious from the lawyer's interest
62. An example is a sociological study of the Detroit school desegregation case, Bradley v.
Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd inpart, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), re'd, 418
U.S. 717 (1974). Wolf, Social Science and the Courts: The Detroit Schools Case, 42 PUB. INMT
102 (1976). The author points to agreement among the parties on the "goodness" of integration as
the reason sociological evidence that racial isolation is not educationally harmful was not intro-
duced, and evidence relied upon in the decision against the school board was of de jure discrimi-
nation in school board actions, not residential patterns. She calls the evidence of the theory of de
jure discrimination "contrived." This adjective makes sense against a scientific search for expla-
nation of a social phenomenon, but does not when one takes into account the norms established
within societal agreement that frame the sphere of factual inquiry. Problem definition, law dis-
cernment and considerations of advocacy shape factual differentiation and selection. Facts indi-
cating de jure discrimination are prominent in the legal pattern, although they may not be
significant as causal factors in a scientific explanation of school segregation.
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in outcome. As partisan advocate, one is interested in a particular re-
sult; even as disinterested decision maker, one is concerned with prob-
lem solving over theory building. What is less obvious is that
adherence to a norm or pattern, while seemingly at odds with a scien-
tific search for truth, does not imply a lack of integrity. It is integral to
the search for legal truth.
Conformance of fact to norms or patterns of meaning is essential to a
system that rests on societal agreement. In the dynamic concept of
lawyering, it is fact assimilation. It is acquisition, differentiation, and
selection of fact by the system of meaning within which lawyers act, the
integrative pattern that shapes legal perception. Facts prominent in
that perception may overshadow those that scientists might agree yield
a more accurate explanation of social phenomena. For instance, an
individual's invidious intent is prominent in legal perception of the
facts of a racial discrimination case, while scientists may find that social
or residential patterns explain the phenomenon of segregated housing
more completely. Facts derive significance in a larger pattern of rela-
tionship agreed upon as meaningful and authoritative in a social insti-
tution. Their significance is tied to their utility in the continued life of
that pattern. The legal term is material facts: material to resolution of
an issue which arises in interpreting and applying past societal
agreement.
Legal fact management is also shaped by its operational context of
problem solving or dispute settlement, deciding the issue arising under
past agreement in a new factual setting. For example, the adversary
process in litigation is a major limit on scientific factual inquiry-evi-
dence relevant to accurate explanation of the social phenomenon in-
volved, but not relevant to issues raised by advocates pitted against one
another, may often be excluded. Evidence that time constraints pre-
vent from being gathered or presented may also be excluded. A deci-
sion may not await more complete factual knowledge.
A lawyer thus has a different operation to perform than a social sci-
entist. The lawyer must work for a practical and effective result within
The contrast is also seen in the distinction between "empiric-analytic" knowledge, suitable to
law as an instrument of social policy ends and which employs social science, and "hermeneutie"
knowledge that focuses on interpersonal meaning, suitable to law as moral legitimist, and which
is less apt to employ social science as a basis of decision. See Post, Legal Concepts and 4pplied
SocialResearch Concepts. Translation Problems, in M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 53, at 172-
75.
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a pattern of meaning embodied in past agreements. Crucial is one's
personal ability in the legal process: knowledge of past authority and
present information, use of legal dialectical reasoning, and skill in im-
plementation. Ability to utilize these with appreciation of law's social
function, with discrimination among and commitment to values em-
bodied in social agreements, and with imagination and courage, may
be called for as well. The lawyer's warranty is tied to law's purpose
and source of truth: "This is my resolution of the new problem; it
should persuade you because it is based upon our common agree-
ments."63 The social scientist, in contrast, seeks to objectify the process
by which he or she assembled and analyzed relevant materials. The
warranty is tied to social science's source of truth: "You can perform
the same method and get the same result, regardless of personal or
societal receptivity or practical consequences."'
The lawyer speaks personally and persuasively, within a received
pattern that unifies relevant materials. It is a distinct pattern, one that
may exclude other patterns of relationship among empirical data. It is
a unity based on societal agreement more than method, on humanistic
authority more than scientific. A lawyer's success, and that of the legal
process, depends more on ability to act with discrimination in the pat-
tern of significance than to criticize from without. The legal process'
interpretation and application of past agreement rests on the lawyer's
personal ability, and the legal community's corporate ability, to receive
faithfully, integrate perceptively, and communicate persuasively.
B. Integration of Social Science Within the Pattern
The distinction between the patterns of relationship for empirical
data in lawyering and in social science is the key to integration of social
science in legal education. First, it adds credence to the practitioner-
training school's criticism, that social science is too "theoretical" for
legal education.
Refining that objection pursuant to the dynamic interrelation of the-
ory and fact management skills is competent lawyering. Social science
method and its knowledge of empirical reality, quite valid with its own
system of meaning and integrity, is not useful learning for lawyering. It
is not helpful in light of the immediate task of solving a specific, dis-
63. Rosenberg, Comments, 23 J. LEoAL EDUC. 199, 203 (1970).
64. Id
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crete problem within the context of past authoritative agreements.
New empirical data that social science offers may play a role, but social
science's interpretation of data, the weight it gives it in causal explana-
tion of social phenomenon, may not be determinative in legal issue res-
olution. The data's value depends on its position in the legal pattern of
meaning or relationship.
Social science cannot provide a complete answer when a court asks:
"What did we as a society agree to in the past? How have the courts
interpreted that and how should we today?" To respond effectively, a
lawyer needs insight into the legal system. Knowledge of specific facts
or empirical evidence, with which social science can assist, is not as
important to the lawyer's functioning as knowledge of how and why
such variables have significance. In this sense, the impatient practice-
oriented student is correct in asking for learning in the law, not knowl-
edge about the law. The student needs the perspective of those who act
within law's pattern of meaning. Primary legal authorities, judicial
opinions, legislation, and legislative history, transmit the pattern of re-
lationship. They transmit insight. Integration of social science in legal
education cannot replace major emphasis on legal materials.
Second, legal process' distinctive pattern of significance excludes the
wholesale incorporation of social science in its own system of meaning,
but does not exclude its integration entirely. The key to effective teach-
ing of social science in law school is integration of social science in the
distinctive pattern of interrelationship among facts, theory, norms, and
operational context that is the legal process.
A starting point for this integration is examination of how social sci-
ence is presently used in the legal process, and how it functions in com-
petent lawyering capacities. Social science presently is almost never
used as a basis of legal decision making.65 One reason is the problem
solving approach that results from legal education based upon appel-
late cases. One commentator identifies ignorance and inertia as pri-
mary reasons lawyers fail to use social science.6 6 As judges are nearly
entirely dependent on lawyers to produce relevant social science find-
ings, lawyers' failings virtually preclude use of social science. Reliance
on an approach that has been successful in the past--traditional legal
65. Lochner, Some Limitations on the Application of Social Science Research in the Legal Pro-
cess, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. (ARIz. ST. L.J.) 815. See also case histories analyzed in M. SAKS &
C. BARON, supra note 53, at 82-117.
66. Lochner, supra note 65, at 824-25.
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analysis of legal materials, especially cases-reduces incentive to try
new approaches that might yield different solutions.
In the analogy to cognitive learning theory, structuring data in one
integrative whole reduces other data to background status. Yet a new
problem that resists solution by the transferred learning approach
forces search for another. New data that cannot be integrated into an
interpretative pattern forces restructuring of perception. Similarly, so-
cial science is used most often when a courtroom lawyer must make a
new argument, use novel proof, or act in the absence of or against pre-
cedent. 67 The most striking use of social science, particularly econom-
ics, in the legal process, has been when a new and fluid statute, lacking
a history of interpretation, needed theory for enforcement: antitrust
and trade regulation are the preeminent examples.68 Instances of first
impression, when existing institutions, doctrine, theory, or method ap-
pear inadequate, give practitioners the incentive to utilize social science
as a basis of decision.
Novelty on a level that disturbs the pattern may call for social sci-
ence, not just as additional evidence in the set legal pattern, but as part
of the pattern itself. A new legislatively-created right without the his-
tory of common law development that identifies significant facts in a
developed theory may fall outside the integrating patterns of past
agreement and interpretation worked out in legal process. For new
categories, one may call on social science. It thus becomes a significant
variable in the pattern.
Occasionally when new legal ground is broken, social science is in-
troduced, but nevertheless is a relatively minor variable in the interplay
of fact, norms, and theory. For example, the holding that racial segre-
gation in education was unconstitutional could be justified by a line of
past judicial interpretation of societal agreement, although social sci-
ence strengthened the credibility of the recent precedent.69 Social sci-
ence in this instance was not integral to the problem solving approach
or the integrating system of meaning, although it was useful.
Social science may have a significant role in fashioning remedies for
public law violations because legal doctrine and theory may be absent
67. Id at 822.
68. Id at 823; comments of John P. Morris, Assessment Conference, supra note 39, at 1054.
69. McLauren v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); Sipnel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); and Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Ca-
nada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), paved the way for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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or unhelpful. Past agreement that de jure racial discrimination in pub-
lic schooling violates equal protection under the constitution, does not
necessarily dictate a specific remedy viable among complex social fac-
tors. Empirical and behavioral variables have room to significantly af-
fect norms and precedent in design of a remedy.70
For the majority of routine tasks, such as incorporating businesses,
writing and probating wills, drafting contracts, and even planning com-
pliance with or litigating under public law provisions, the private prac-
titioner does not need social science. For the majority of trivial cases,
governed by precedent or its noncontroversial extension by accepted
legal reasoning, judges do not need social science. This is not because
social fact is irrelevant to these legal operations, but because its role
with norms and theory in the pattern of relationship relevant to the task
is established. Norms, theory, doctrine, and tasks operate in the
processes of fact assimilation and selection to limit infusion of new fac-
tual perspective and relationship.
For example, the social function of contract in society, theory of con-
tract, relevant legal dialectics in construction of contract law, and con-
tract drafting skills are not set in cement. Factual knowledge or
hypotheses undergird contract law, and new information and variety in
factual problems penetrate its practice. Nevertheless, when only the
particular stated facts change, but not the role, the weight, or signifi-
cance of those facts, the competent practitioner has the necessary learn-
ing approach for satisfactory problem resolution without aid from
social science. Competent lawyering by fact management may draw
upon social science, but the factual inquiry is limited sharply by settled
legal perspective, theory, and doctrine. The problem is already legally
defined, the relevant law discernible, the avenue of successful advocacy
clear. The innovative and well-funded attorney may use social science,
within the limited scope given it by the legal process, to find new facts,
develop or verify them. Ignorance, inertia, and limits of time and
money may and probably will prevail. The process of decision may
suffer in quality, but neither judge, opponent, nor client is likely to pro-
vide incentive to use social science. The pattern that gives particular
facts significance remains and it is inclusive enough to integrate or ac-
commodate change in factual particulars. Inaccuracies-failure to find
70. See, eg., Wolf, smpra note 62, who attributes an interdistrict busing order to a judge's
change in attitude wrought by social science evidence.
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a key fact or to accurately identify causal relations-may be revealed
and corrected by fact management skill in the incremental process of
case law growth.
In development of legal rights created at common law, fact and the-
ory correlate in legal process so that a large gap is seldom present for
social science to fill. Past interpretation of societal agreement not only
narrows the relevant scope of factual inquiry, but personal ability in
legal process--use and understanding of accepted norms, theory, and
legal reasoning-may overshadow the role of new empirical percep-
tion. Novelty strains the process of case law growth, however, and thus
provides an incentive to use social science in practice.
Brown v. Board of Education7 marked a point of change, restructur-
ing of an integrative pattern of meaning embodied in past agreement
and its interpretation. It was not wholesale abandonment of the
learned approach, as the line of precedent leading to it illustrates.72 It
was change in a major cue, a salient part of the pattern of meaning.
Equality in separateness was no longer a criterion to use in finding and
selecting facts, no longer the premise for legal problem definition or
resolution in the social reality of race relations. It was replaced by dis-
crimination alone, official separation. The fact that separate accommo-
dations were equal did not carry the significance it had in the earlier
formulation.
Social science findings of educational harm from racial segregation
in schooling were cited by the Court. Few find in them the basis of the
decision, either as motivation for judicial behavior or as significant
variables in the logic of the decision. The weight of the social science
data in the justices' personal decision making is not evident from their
opinion. The opinion is the product of their personal ability in legal
method-analysis, synthesis, imaginative extension-and is warranted
by its resolution of a problem in a persuasive manner. It is possible to
discount the use of social science findings as makeweight. Neverthe-
less, its use is an entry point for social science in the legal process. In a
time of novelty, when legal norms and theory are in flux, the relevant
range of empirical inquiry widens. "It may be the basis of new integra-
tive principles; it may be proof of factual assumptions underlying com-
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See note 69 supra.
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peting theories; or it may be makeweight when a change is made on
other grounds.
Novelty, the point for social science integration, is also a point in
which the distinctions noted above between legal and social science are
most apparent. The lawyer's personal skill and warranty of persuasive
legal analysis is most distinctive in new areas. The perspective of
choice means the pattern of relationship between empirical data,
norms, and theory is to some extent a personal one, reflecting how a
system of meaning is received and transferred to new problems by an
actor in the legal process. The learner who hopes to act within that
system of meaning needs to learn not only what that decision maker
received, what legal sources were called upon, but how they were
weighed, analyzed, synthesized; which were decisive in the new situa-
tion and why. The learner needs to appreciate a living pattern, one
forged by an actor sensitive to variables of norms, theory, and social
fact.
C. An Example of Distinct Integrative Patterns
Social science's limited utility in the legal process of interpreting and
applying past agreement is evident in the findings of a sociologist's
study of the 1971 Detroit school desegregation litigation.73 Eleanor P.
Wolf evaluated the quality and comprehensiveness of social science
materials introduced to determine whether judicial decisions at various
levels accurately reflected the weight of social science evidence offered.
She found significant omission of relevant social science data due to the
adversary method and the parties' consensus on empirical value ques-
tions she considered open, such as the social benefits of integration and
the educational harm of racial isolation. She found an unclear line be-
tween facts and their interpretation, and contrivance in factual inquiry
into dejure segregative acts when other social-economic variables, such
as residential segregation, appeared more causally related to present de
facto segregation. She also found insufficient appreciation, not so
much of the peculiarities of social science research methods, but of the
basics of scientific causation. For instance, evidence on educational re-
source allocation to black and white schools was offered with student
73. Wolf, supra note 62 (citing Bradley v. Millikin, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), af'd
inpart, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)). See also Wolf, Northern School
Desegregation and Residential Choice, in P. KURLAND & G. CASPER, SUPREME COURT REVIEW
63-85 (1977).
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achievement level statistics, but no explanation of how to discover
whether any causal relationship existed between the two. She also con-
cluded that regardless of whether it appears in the legal ground for a
decision, social science has a large role in influencing a judge's general
perspective, "educating" to social fact within the limits of the adver-
sarial procedure.
The study is valuable in its demonstration both of limits to the socio-
logical explanation of the legal process for learning to practice within
that process, and the role of social science in the legal process. The
most striking aspect of the study, however, is its failure to see that legal
perspective, theory, and doctrine interact with facts to limit the relevant
universe for pertinent social science inquiry. Her basic premise, that
judicial decisions should accurately reflect the weight of social science
evidence, assumes that social science's own interpretation of its data
should govern use and interpretation of the data in the process of legal
decision making.
Because of the parties' expressed consensus on the "moral and ideo-
logical imperatives" of the goal of integration in public schooling, evi-
dence tending to undermine factual assumptions that racial and class
heterogeneity improves education performance was not introduced.
Wolf believes this consensus influenced the trial judge greatly, perhaps
even causing him to change from pretrial rejection of busing as a rem-
edy to ordering unprecedented interdistrict busing. She notes, how-
ever, that the legal basis for that remedial order was not social science
evidence of educational harm from racial isolation, but findings of de
jure discrimination in school site selection, pupil transportation poli-
cies, and boundary changes. Because Wolf is convinced this de jure
discrimination is not the cause of school segregation, she examined the
evidence of de jure discrimination for evidence of specific causation
and found it contrived. She thought it was "blurred" with interpreta-
tion and value choices or lack thereof. For instance, whether a small
neighborhood homogeneous school should be valued over a larger, dis-
tant heterogeneous one was a question she thought should have been
addressed.
The goal of school racial integration was, for the district court partic-
ularly, a settled normative interpretation of past agreement. Incentive
to introduce social science evidence that racial segregation may not
harm educational achievement therefore was slight, unless the possibil-
ity of change was sensed. More significantly, those who act within the
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legal system have a sense of the relative weight of the role of empirical
data. In this area the role of norms articulated by the courts as part of
the societal agreement has been great, so the practitioner would not
have expected new empirical evidence alone to change the legal stan-
dard. Again, the practitioner may have been aware that post-1954 acts
of de jure discrimination probably are not causes of present segregated
schooling patterns or not a cause that may be isolated from other socio-
economic factors, such as those affecting residential patterns. However,
interaction of a multitude of variables beyond an actor's or entity's con-
trol has not been held to violate past societal agreement so as to allow
court ordering of events.
Wolfs critique of factual causal proof in the context of social or edu-
cational policy choices may be valid, and the court's use of factual as-
sumptions about researchable subjects and present day behavior needs
social science critique.74 Her study does not reflect, however, an under-
standing of the role of new empirical data among other variables and
cues for legal problem solving. From a legal perspective, interpreting
factual evidence in the light of de jure discrimination is not contrived,
but consistent with authoritative interpretation of past agreements. De
jure discrimination is a cue or integrative pattern in legal operations
concerning the broad social phenomenon of racial discrimination. The
legal problem that guides fact discernment is not sound educational
policy by itself; it is what conduct violates a particular societal agree-
ment so as to warrant court ordering of future events. Social science
evidence was used for proof in a narrow, legal universe, not to prove
causation in the scientists' larger context of social realties.75
The effect of social science evidence of educational harm that Wolf
noted in the judge's attitude toward remedy illustrates that the effect of
social science is not accurately gauged by the legal reasoning used in an
74. Moynihan, supra note 61, distinguishes between court interpretation of past agreements,
in which what the court says is true, and legal statements of future prediction in researchable,
discoverable subjects. In the latter, social science critique is valid, in a mode of argument in which
reasoning is more empirically based and more exposed and less subjective and value laden. This
is indeed where WoWs criticism serves a valid purpose. Its utility in this latter type of legal rea-
soning is limited if the social science does not recognize the role of that reasoning in the overall
legal process-its interplay with norms, theory and limited range of choice-and that the former
type reasoning, value laden interpretation of past agreement, is valid and limits the scope of the
latter reasonings.
75. The concept of the limited scope of a legal universe, in which social science may operate
in a manner that is manageable for those within the legal process, is from M. FINKELSTEIN,
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 15 (1978).
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opinion to justify a decision. More significantly, it shows that the lim-
ited extent to which social science did permeate the legal process was
determined by the personal perspective of the decision maker. It was in
the personal integration of norms, theory, and empirical evidence for a
particular choice that novelty entered the legal process.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING METHOD AND MATERIALS FROM
UNIFIED LAWYERING CAPACITIES AS AN INTEGRATIVE
LEARNING PATTERN
Insight, appreciation of law's unifying pattern of relationship so as to
make the pattern one's own and enter into it, is the goal of education
for practice of law. Insight is transmitted when students experience
cognitive restructuring of material in the new pattern, that of lawyering
or unified lawyering capacities. Teaching materials and methods there-
fore should facilitate teaching unified lawyering capacities as a new
pattern for integrating law school learning; a learning approach to
transfer to new problems; and an experience of receiving and entering a
structure of meaning that changes one's perception.
How does one transmit insight as a pattern for integrating social sci-
ence? Social science materials may play a valuable role in isolating
what variables have been most significant in lawyering. However,
when presented in its own system of meaning, social science cannot
transmit the personal integration of decision; it does not speak from
within the legal process.76 It will thus seldom be of decisive conse-
quence for the practitioner in the dilemma of choice, although in the
face of the demands of novelty, he or she may call upon it.
Teaching substantive social science knowledge or findings in law
school is likely to be ineffective or inefficient. First, there is little sub-
stantive knowledge on specific legal issues, that is, in the limited con-
text in which social science operates within the legal process, there may
76. Particularly exemplary is the most frequent type of sociological research: behavioral
analysis of judicial decisions. See H. BAADE, JURIMETRICS 1-4 (1963). The behavioral approach,
in emphasizing factors and outcome over the language of decision, ignores the fact that in an
opinion one actor in the process sought to communicate to another--to speak, speak persuasively,
and within the common pattern of meaning. Llewellyn pointed out the rhetoric of an appellate
decision is intended to guide lower courts in analogous cases not yet decided. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN-DECIDING APPEALs 14 n.9 (1960), quotedin H. BAADE, supra, at
3. This purpose of legal statement, assistance in decision making or choice, is neglected by behav-
ioral analysis.
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well be little readily available specific knowledge.7 7 Second, lawyers
usually have incentive to use social science only when they face new
questions, which are precisely those on which specific social science re-
search generally will be incomplete. Time and cost constraints may
make the research unfeasible. Social science method rather than sub-
stantive findings may be a more useful subject of instruction. An ap-
preciation of the method enables the practitioner to critically examine
social science evidence and to work with scientists because of acquain-
tance with advantages and disadvantages, explanatory weaknesses and
strengths of various research methods.7" Method is best taught in con-
junction with substantive content, however, just as in law the examina-
tion of particular primary materials, cases, and statutes, imparts a sense
of legal method better than a treatise on method alone. The problem
solving approach is gleaned from repeated specific instances. For edu-
cation whose aim is preparation for the generalist practice of law, re-
peated exposure to social science materials in their entirety and in their
own context will not be a time- or cost-effective manner of imparting
acquaintance with social science methodology. Such courses have re-
mained on the periphery of curricula.
The key is in the use of legal materials-materials that are the
unique content of legal practice and of legal scholarship. The interplay
of empirical, normative, and theoretical variables in a living integrative
pattern, in the context of choice and novelty, is best learned in or via
the actual materials of the law: in the cases, statutes, and administra-
tive regulations and decisions themselves.
Such an approach confirms Schwartz's assertion that the failure of
social science to permeate the structure of legal education indicates
77. Hans Zeisel, eminent in the field of sociological research, states this from the point of
view of "micro" findings, Ze., rather than general insights on large social question from empiri-
cally based social theory, the effect of a variable, for instance jury size, on a specific outcome, such
as murder verdicts. Zeisel, supra note 39, at 979. In this area of inquiry there is little research by
either social scientists or lawyers. Zeisel, Of Social Research Methods and Competencyfor Lawyers
Therein, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 240, 241 (1970). Moreover, social science seldom can predict specific
development: the larger role of individual behavior over group behavior, the less social science
has to offer in the way of prediction. P. HORTON & C. HUNT, supra note 38, at 32; Zeisel, supra
note 39, at 979. Moynihan, supra note 61, points out the instability of substantive social science
knowledge: the revisionism inherent in scientific method as a source of truth.
78. Zeisel, supra note 77, at 240-42, urged this should be the aim of a separate course of
instruction on social science in a law school, using presently available case materials in which
social science is prominent.
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something worthy of preservation.79 It also reflects the imprint of the
practical profession on law and legal education. It stems from appreci-
ation of lawyering capacities as the criterion for integrating subject
matter, the pattern of relationship or meaning for law and legal
education.
Opposition to early realist attempts to revamp legal education by so-
cial science's theory and method illustrates legal education's firm his-
torical grounding as preparation for a particular profession. The
present structure of legal education does the same. The categories of
study have remained largely the legal definitional areas in which law-
yers must assimilate, select, analyze, and advocate admittedly social
fact to gain relief, to solve an immediate problem within societal insti-
tutions. The materials of study have remained the materials of prac-
tice-primary sources of the law. These were formerly and for too long
exclusively appellate court cases, but increasingly are trial court and
administrative cases, legislation at all levels of government, regulatory,
arbitration, and negotiation materials, all of which correspond to the
growth of these materials in the profession's world of practice.
These materials are units of practice--materials undeniably relevant
to professional preparation because they are both the product of and
the subject matter for, the ongoing legal process.Y0 As product, unified
lawyering capacities are revealed in their dissection: a sense of norms
and social context, assimilation of legal and nonlegal information and
theory, exercise of legal reasoning, skill in the operational context of
case decision, legislative drafting, regulatory interpretation. They are
empirical data for learning legal process; they are actual units of prac-
tice, in contrast to writing about law either by social scientists or tradi-
tional legal scholars in hombooks or treatises.
If the unifying matter of dynamic interrelationship in the lawyering
capacities is grasped, the materials have yielded far more than an item
of information or a legal rule. They yield insight the student can trans-
fer to new situations.
A case that utilizes, misuses, or fails to use social science can teach
where social science has a role in the legal process. The primary learn-
ing is not substantive social science knowledge or even its method, but
its place in a complex interplay of norms, empirical information, and
79. See generally M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13.
80. The term, "units of practice," is from Casper, Law Schools Do Not Know Whether to
Teach Chords or Songs, LEARNING & L., Fall 1974, at 28, 32.
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theory in authoritative interpretation of past agreement. The relation
of social science to humanistic authority, that is, to the context of past
agreement and the lawyer's personal competence in lawyering, is the
primary learning goal.
The use of cases or legislative histories as teaching materials is ad-
vantageous because they illustrate interplay of norms, facts, and theory
in the context of decision making.. They are concrete materials, not
secondary presentations about the law. This characteristic serves laud-
able educational goals: the students wrestle with primary sources of
law. The resultant insight is truly one's own. It comes through partici-
pation in a pattern of meaning and through the activity of relating new
knowledge to that pattern. It becomes part of one's intellectual equip-
ment in a manner quite different from taking another's classification
from a treatise. These materials are also manageable materials for in-
clusion in textbook and classroom discussion. If insight into a pattern
is the goal, numerous highly edited materials will not serve as well as
dissection and critical analysis of a few complete primary law materi-
als. These materials are more apt to be within the law professor's
sphere of competence than social science ones. To be sure, a professor
must master social science empirical data and theory, at least to the
extent it is utilized in legal materials, to master a legal subject area. As
Wolf's study demonstrates, legal materials can be dissected and ana-
lyzed in terms of their treatment of empirical data and use of scientific
method. A law professor, however, would use his or her competence in
legal method to dissect in a manner different from that employed by
Wolf, emphasizing the legal process, the complex interplay with empir-
ical data of norms and theory in the context of past agreement and
institutional constraints on choice.
Use of the case method as it is defined here, intensive analysis of a
primary source, does not necessarily limit materials to cases or limit
dissection of legal materials to their own text. Intensive study of a
source of law, material that embodies the legal process, in a manner
that encourages the student to go through that process critically and
empathetically, serves the purpose of the case method. Statutes and
administrative rulings or regulations can be subjected to the same
method. Social science data, selected by its inclusion, modification, or
exclusion in legal materials, can also be used. With primary sources as
the key, criticism of misuse or nonuse of social science furthers insight.
Materials that are actual illustrations of social science's integration in
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the legal system of meaning by an actor or actors in that process will be
most effective for learning that is useful for lawyering, for insight.
Reliance on primary sources of the law in teaching need not result in
conceptually closed or professionally parochial education. It merely
reflects a principle of social science integration predicated upon the le-
gal process as it is known to those operating within it. Other materials,
secondary sources or social science studies about law, also reveal pat-
terns, but they are classifications of what primary decision makers or
writers have done, and are a step removed from the process itself. They
supplement by providing learning about the law."' They offer learning
cues but their study does not give the student the experience of utilizing
or even restructuring a received pattern. They cannot provide entry
into the process firsthand.
The most important characteristic of the criterion for refined integra-
tion of social science materials in a law course is reliance on primary
sources of law for the conceptual framework. These convey to the stu-
dent the sense of a live pattern continually integrating social fact in the
crucible of decision and action, the pattern itself occasionally being re-
structured in the face of novelty. While social science should not define
legal instruction, neither should it be relegated to providing descriptive
background for legal problems. As the fact management process un-
derlying lawyering capacities illustrates, assimilating and presenting so-
cial or economic fact is integral to lawyering. It is exemplified in
primary legal sources; it is a constituent part of the pattern of meaning
for legal decision making. Social science refines and changes legal fact
management; it provides new means of fact finding, new theories to test
fact relevance, new standards of criticism for factually verifiable con-
clusions. It needs to be taught, therefore, but mastery of its findings,
theories, and standards is far less important than understanding their
role in fact management and fact management's role in competent
lawyering capacities.
Use of legal materials admittedly excludes teaching the learning ap-
proach of social science. Nevertheless, by stressing the living nature of
81. A good example is inclusion of regression equation analysis of relevant considerations in
zoning amendment appeal cases in case notes following an appellate zoning opinion in C. HAAR,
LAND-USE PLANNING 377 & Supp. 57 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1980). The note is among others
requiring the student to draft a statute, give a client advice in a problem situation, and consider
ramifications for professional ethics from factual variations. The conceptual framework was a
setting in which the various factors in the regression analysis were integrated in decision in the
legal process: an actual case.
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the system of meaning that is taught, the entry points for social science
and for novelty in the legal process, instructors can avoid teaching a
learning approach that rigidly excludes integration of knowledge about
social reality. Novelty best shows the living character of the legal sys-
tem's patterns, and this is also when social science is most apt to influ-
ence the pattern and be the basis of the decision. Novelty illustrates
social science entry, it use, and limits upon its use as a basis for legal
decision. It also dramatizes the perspective of choice and the emphasis
law places on personal competence in lawyering capacities. Materials
that are responses to novelty may not be typical of those encountered
daily by practitioners, but they yield insight transferable to new situa-
tions. They yield insights not into the methods and knowledge of social
science, but into the dynamic pattern of relationship among the capaci-
ties of perspective, information, reasoning, and applied skill that is the
essence of even the trivial or the routine in lawyering.
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